Israel Strikes Syria - Aims to Prevent Transfer pf Game-Changing Missiles to Hezbollah

Israeli warplanes struck Syria over the weekend near Jamraya

As I discussed in a number of previous blog posts - for example here - I have long seen the situation in Syria as a sectarian civil war between the majority Sunni population and the Alawite minority that forms the backbone of the Assad regime. Israel - wisely enough - has remained aloof from the Syrian civil war.

However, Israel has always made clear that it's one "red line" in the conflict was that it would not tolerate the transfer from Assad to Hezbollah of game changing weapons such as advanced anti-aircraft missiles or longer range ground-to-ground missiles. Next to Iran, Israel sees Hezbollah as it's mortal enemy and fears the Lebanese Shiite organization far more then the Assad regime. Israel already struck Syria once previously, attacking a convoy to Lebanon carrying SS-17 missiles which were likely destined for Hezbollah.

Over the weekend, Israel struck Syria twice in two days, again to prevent the transfer of advanced weaponry to Hezbollah. In the most recent cases, it appears the target of Saturday and Sunday's attack were a shipment of Iranian made Fatah-110 missiles being delivered to Hezbollah through Syria. Analysts say the Fateh-110 could put the Tel Aviv metropolis in range of Hezbollah gunners, 100 km (60 miles) to the north, which would bolster the arsenal of a group that fired some 4,000 shorter-range rockets into Israel during a month-long war in 2006. The second bombing, this past Sunday May 5th, was particularly intense. It appears Israel struck a weapons research facility and warehouse in the Syrian town of Jamraya.

In an article on the NBC news website, diplomatic correspondent Martin Fletcher outlined the four types of weapons systems Israel would not tolerate being transferred to Hezbollah:

Analysts here say there are four weapons systems on Israel’s blacklist, whose transfer through Syria would trigger air attacks: guided ground to ground rockets like the Iranian Fateh 110’s reportedly destroyed in this weekend’s attack; chemical weapons; land to sea missiles like Russian Yakhont missiles that can hit a ship 200 miles at sea at speeds of up to Mach 2; and anti-aircraft rockets like the SAM 17s that would endanger Israel’s control of the skies.

My opinion is that Israel has reached the point where it is no longer to willingly accept the transfer of weaponry from Iran or Syria to Hezbollah; if that is indeed the case, we can expect more Israeli strikes within Syria going forward.

If you want to read the NBC article by Martin Fletcher, here it is. If you are interested to understand more about the interplay between Israel, Iran and Hezbollah, I also would recommend reading a previous series of posts I did on the subject:

Part 1: If Israel Bombs Iran, Will Hezbollah Attack Israel?

Part 2: Possible Israeli responses if it is attacked by Hezbollah

Part 3: An overview of Hezbollah's arsenal of missiles (with several infographics)

Part 4: The Israeli Military Plans to Destroy Hezbollah in the Next War

Part 5: Analysis by the Brookings Institution on How the Next Israeli-Hezbollah War Might Unfold

Israel Planning a 10 Mile Buffer Zone in Syria as the Assad Regime Crumbles

Israel once had a buffer zone in southern Lebanon as well

As a follow-up from my just published post on the Israeli air strikes in Syria, I just came across a news report - which evidently originated in the UK's Sunday Times - that Israel is planning a buffer zone" of 10 miles in northern Syria if or when the Assad regime finally crumbles. Israel of course has a long northern border with Syria, and the Israelis fear that in the chaos that would surely follow a collapse of the Assad regime they (the Israelis) would be faced with jihadist forces on their northern border.

Israel and Syria have fought three major wars against each other - 1948, 1967 and 1973 - and both Hafez al-Assad and his son Bashar have demonstrated implacable hostility towards the Israelis. Nevertheless, from Israel's perspective, the Assad's have kept Israel's northern front quiet for 40 years, and Israel has generally taken the attitude of "the devil you know is better then the devil you don't" in its' attitude towards the Assad regime. However, while there is no doubt that Israel would obtain some benefits from the fall of the Assad regime - the regime is after all a close ally of both Hezbollah and Israel's mortal enemy Iran - the Israelis' fear of what exactly might be on their northern border after Assad falls is also legitimate fear in my opinion.

If you look at what has happened recently in the Middle East recently after authoritarian regimes have fallen, the picture is not exactly comforting. In Iraq, chaos and civil war erupted after Saddam Hussein fell; in Libya, after Ghaddafi was killed, we have seen a great deal of chaos in the country, including of course the jihadist
attack on the US consulate in Benghazi which killed four Americans, including the US Ambassador. And now, in Egypt, well let's just say the situation is not exactly trending towards stability.

Turning again to the possibility of Israel establishing a buffer zone on on the territory of one of its' neighbors is not unprecedented. As the map above demonstrates, Israel kept a buffer zone in southern Lebanon for over 15 years to keep Hezbollah away from its northern border. However, maintaining this buffer zone was a constant struggle for the Israelis against determined Hezbollah guerrillas  which some commentators even described as being a "mini Vietnam" for the Israeli Defense Forces. While we are currently just seeing speculation, it does seem quite credible that Israel would now be planning for security contingencies in a post-Assad world.

Israel Strikes Targets in Syria - Why, What and Where Did the Attacks Take Place?

Israel has acted on its threats to ensure that no advanced weapons are
transferred from the Assad regime to Hezbollah

Last Tuesday, January 29th, Israeli war planes struck a convoy of SS-17 missiles heading towards the Lebanese border. The Israelis had made clear that one of their "red lines" in the Syrian conflict was that it was unacceptable to them for the Assad regime to transfer advanced weaponry and/or chemical weapons to Israel's arch-enemies Hezbollah in Lebanon. Israel and Hezbollah fought a bitterly contested, 34 day war in 2006, and both sides have since been preparing for what they both see as the inevitable next conflict. Awhile back, I wrote a five part series of posts looking at the military balance between Israel and Hezbollah, and how conflict between them might be played out.  Here is Part 1, Part 2, Part 3, Part 4 and Part 5 of the Israel Hezbollah series (Note: all posts are fairly sure with a concentration on maps and graphics).

There have been a number of reports in the media of what and where Israel attacked in Syria, such as:

• Israel attacked a convoy carrying SS-17 missiles to Lebanon;
• Israel attached the SS-17 convoy, and a Syrian military base in the town of Jamraya that was a research center for chemical and biological weapons;
• The SS-17 missiles were still at Jamraya, and Israel destroyed both the military base and the weapons in one fell swoop, rather then waiting until the missiles were on the road (here is a good article from Mcclatchy news service on this theory).
• Finally, there have even been recent reports that Israel also struck other targets in addition to the Jamraya military base and the SS-17 missiles, including an Iranian run intel post in southern Syria targeted at Israel.

While it is difficult to say exactly what happened - the Israelis are being quite coy about things - it is undoubtedly true that both Israel and the US are deathly afraid that as the Assad regime crumbles, some of its chemical or biological weapons or other advanced weaponry could fall into the hands of either Hezbollah in Lebanon, or potentially even worse, Sunni jihadist rebels in Syria from the al-Nusra front who are aligned with al-Qaeda. In fact, the US  itself appears to be so worried that it has given the Israelis the green light for the IDF to strike further targets in Syria if necessary, while the US has also made clear that it is prepared to use maximum force - including special operations troops - to secure any chemical or biological weapons as the chaos in Syria continues.

As always in the Middle East, it is hard to say exactly what happened and what are the motives of the main players, but of one thing I am almost certain - we have not seen the last of Israeli strikes in Syria to prevent the leakage of any advanced weaponry to its enemies.

Tartus - The Capital of the Future Alawite State of "Alawistan"?

Tartus is located on the Mediterranean in the Alawite heartland

As I noted in my previous post, the Assad regime may see a retreat to the Alawite heartland along the coast of the Mediterranean as a way to stave off ultimate defeat, and perhaps even their own destruction.  I have noted that this idea of the formation of an Alawite State in Syria may well be an "end-game" the regime is keeping in its back pocket if it appears they will be defeated in Damascus.

In that regard, I just read a fascinating article in the New York Times on how the city of Tartus in the Alawite heartland is thriving despite the bloody Sunni-Alawite/Shia civil war in the rest of Syria.  The Times article noted that there are numerous indications that security forces may indeed be laying the logistical groundwork for the formation of a separate Alawite state in the region.  Some of the indicators include the possibility of turning a tiny local airfield into a full airport, as well as the regime's forces tightening security checkpoints around what could be the borders of a separate Alawite state of "Alawistan".

The Times article had an interesting summary of what current regime thinking on creating an Alawite state might be:

Should Damascus fall to the opposition, Tartus could become the heart of an attempt to create a different country. Some expect Mr. Assad and the security elite will try to survive the collapse by establishing a rump Alawite state along the coast, with Tartus as their new capital.

I personally am not sure if the idea of a separate Alawite state is feasible logistically or militarily for the regime and its' Alawite supporters, but do bear in mind that there is precedent for this, as a separate Alawite state called Aleppo actually existed under the French mandate from 1920-1946.  At any rate, I think one would have to be willfully blind to ignore the fact that conflict in Syria is largely a sectarian civil war between the Shia Alawites and the Sunni majority.

For those interested, here is the link to the NY Times article referenced above.

Sunni-Shia Battle and Possibility of an Alawite State in Syria

Could there be an attempt to establish a separate Alawite state in Syria?

As I've noted in some previous posts, Syria's civil war can be best understood through the clear prism of a Sunni-Shia/Alawite battle in Syria.  Furthermore, there has also been a lot of discussion about how the endgame for Assad and the Alawites may well be an Alawite state in Syria.

Last week, I read a very interesting article in Time magazine by Tony Karon.  The article provided an overview of the current situation in Syria, including whether the Assad regime might be desparate enough to use chemical weapons against the rebels in an act of Desperation.  In discussing how the war in Syria might end, Karon discusses how the regime in Syria is actually based on the sectarian control of Syria by the Alawite majority::

A fracturing of Syria could, in the minds of some of the hard men around Assad, offer the prospect of salvaging more than they might if the regime is defeated and replaced by a strong, Sunni-dominated central state.  Assad’s regime is not so much a personality-cult dictatorship as it is a system of Alawite minority rule and privilege, and its core remains a cohesive, heavily armed and highly motivated Alawite-dominated army that believes it is fighting for the survival of its community. Even once it recognizes that it can no longer rule the entire country, its sectarian communal logic may militate against making a desperate last stand in Damascus, a predominantly Sunni city.

Given the sectarian nature of the minority Alawite regime in Syria, Karon notes that the Alawite leadership around Assad may well see it in their interests to see Syria completely fracture around them, as this may make it possible for the Alawites to establish a separate Alawite state in Syria around the Alawite heartland in western Syria centered the coastal cities of Tartus and Lakatia.  Karon notes the following:

Unlike Gaddafi in Libya, Assad is ruling on behalf of a community, and the key decisions may not be his alone to make. The Alawite strongmen around him don’t want to commit suicide. They want to protect themselves and their families from the violent retribution they fear is inevitable if the regime falls. That may make them more likely to favor a retreat to the Alawite heartland along the coast, where they’ll have a greater base of strength than they do in Damascus. If so, the regime, as we know it, will have fallen, but the civil war would be far from over.

I found Karon's article an excellent read, and it confirms my opinion that one possible endgame -  at least in the mind of the Alawite leadership around Assad - is a retreat from Damascus and an attempt to establish a separate Alawite state in Syria.  Here is the link to Karon's article.

Israel's Missile Defense Shields - Part 3: ARROW

In my two previous posts on Israel's missile defense structure, I discussed the Israelis' Iron Dome and David's Sling systems.  Today, I will briefly mention the third component of Israel's missile defense shield, the Arrow system.  While Iron Dome and David's Sling are designed to deal with short to medium range missiles, the Arrow system is designed to knock long range ballistic missiles out of the sky.

While Iron Dome and David's Sling were largely designed for use against Hamas and Hezbollah, the Arrow is seen as a defense against Iran's ballistic missiles.  The Arrow Missile-Killer system is a joint-venture between Boeing of the US and IAI (Israel Aircraft Industries) of Israel.  Currently, there are two Arrow batteries deployed, one in Northern Israel and one outside of Tel Aviv.  So far, the Arrow has gone through two iterations, but the real "killer app" for the Arrow will be the planned Arrow-3.  Currently, there are two Arrow batteries deployed, one in Northern Israel and one outside of Tel Aviv.

The Arrow-3 is designed to intercept incoming ballistic missiles in space outside the Earth's atmosphere in the final phase of their trajectory and destroy them on impact.  The Arrow-2 - the version operationally deployed by the Israeli military - is built to destroy hostile missiles at lower altitudes within the atmosphere by exploding near them.  Any day now, we can expect that the new Arrow-3 missile will be tested live, and this should give the Israelis a keen sense of where their progress on their overall missile defense infrastructure stands.

Here is an article from the website Defense Daily analyzing the capabilities of the Arrow system, and below a depiction of how the Arrow is designed to work.

Israel's Arrow Missile Defense System Works

Israel's Missile Defense Shields - Part 2: DAVID'S SLING

David's Sling will join Iron Dome as part of Israel's missile defense structure

As I noted in my previous post, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) are developing a multitiered missile defense system.  The most well known of the Israeli systems, due to the reason conflict with Hamas, is Israel's Iron Dome.  The Israelis, however, are not limited to Iron Dome alone, and are also developing other missile defense technologies.

The latest technology the Israelis have developed is a system called "David's Sling", which has been developed by Israel's Rafael Defense Systems (essentially, Rafael is the Lockheed Martin or Raytheon of Israel's defense industry) with assistance from US contractor Raytheon.  The main issues with the Iron Dome system are twofold:

• Iron Dome is designed to destroy only short-range missiles, up to approximately 75kms from what I've read.  David's Sling, by contrast, can intercept missiles which can fly up to 300kms, making it - in theory - an ideal solution for handling Hesbollah's growing arsenal of missiles that it can fire at Israel.
• Second, Iron Dome is expensive, as each missile costs between $50,000 - $1000,000.  David's Sling should be substantially cheaper.

The Israelis just successfully tested David's Sling in southern Israel on November 25th.  David's Sling uses a so-called "stunner" technology, and is scheduled for full deployment by 2014, and assuming its' development continues to progress, it will make a formidable addition to the IDF's missile defense arsenal.

Here is an article with more technical details on the successful test of David's Sling.